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INTEREST OF AMICI
Amici, historians and scholars with expertise in
constitutional law and the electoral process, submit this
brief in support of the Presidential Electors. 1 The brief
explains the rich, nuanced historical backdrop that must
inform the Court’s consideration of this case.
Michael L. Rosin is an independent scholar who
has analyzed historical source material about the origins
of the Electoral College, proposed and adopted
constitutional amendments, and congressional debate on
disputed electoral votes. This brief draws on Mr. Rosin’s
detailed research.
David G. Post was I. Herman Stern Professor at
Beasley School of Law, Temple University, before
retiring in 2015. He is affiliated with the Center for
Democracy and Technology, the Institute for Information
Law and Policy at New York Law School, and the Cato
Institute. He has authored numerous academic works and
has submitted several amicus briefs to the Court.
David F. Forte is Professor of Law at Cleveland
State University, teaching courses on constitutional law,
the Federalist Papers, and the presidency. He has
authored and edited works concerning the original
understanding of the Constitution.
Michael Stokes Paulsen is Distinguished
University Chair and Professor of Law at the University
All parties have filed written consents to the filing of briefs by amici
curiae with the Clerk of the Court. No party nor party’s counsel
authored this brief in whole or in part, or made a monetary
contribution intended to fund its preparation or submission. No
person other than amici or their counsel made a monetary
contribution to its preparation or submission.
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of St. Thomas. He is a constitutional law scholar, author
of more than ninety articles, and co-author of a leading
casebook on the constitution. His published work on the
constitutional voting autonomy of electors predates these
litigations. Paulsen, The Constitutional Power of the
Electoral College (Public Discourse, Nov. 21, 2016),
https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2016/11/18283/.
Sotirios Barber is Professor of Political Science at
the University of Notre Dame. He has authored
numerous works on constitutional theory, law, and
interpretation and held fellowships from the National
Endowment for the Humanities and the American
Council of Learned Societies.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Framers of the Constitution crafted the
Electoral College to be an independent institution with
the responsibility of selecting the President and VicePresident. Therefore, they intended each elector to
exercise independent judgment in deciding whom to vote
for. A state cannot revise the Constitution unilaterally by
reducing the elector to a ministerial agent who must vote
in a particular way or face a sanction. The question of each
elector’s moral or political obligation is not before the
Court. Nor is the desirability of the current electoral
system. Rather, this case turns on what the Constitution
allows, and what it prohibits. The historical record
strongly supports the notion that the Constitution allows
an elector to exercise independent judgment and
prohibits a State from interfering with an elector’s ability
to do so—a position Congress has consistently reaffirmed.
First, the Framers intended each elector to be
independent and entitled to vote freely. Article II’s plain
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language, along with contemporaneous historical
evidence from ratification through the first several
elections, demonstrates this common understanding and
negates the notion of an elector as a ministerial
functionary.
Second, Congress’s debates on adopted and
proposed constitutional amendments reflect the same
understanding.
Before
approving
the
Twelfth
Amendment, Congress discussed the elector’s role,
ultimately requiring each elector to designate votes
between President and Vice-President. Those debates did
not evince a desire to control an elector’s votes or
empower states to do so. The 1961 debates on
implementing the Twenty-Third Amendment, which
provided electors to the District of Columbia, reflected
the same view. At most, a state’s pledging requirements
exert only a “moral suasion” over an elector’s choices.
Likewise,
congressional
debates
on
proposed
amendments consistently reflect the view that electors
enjoy constitutionally guaranteed discretion in casting
their votes.
Third, the results of the electoral process time and
again reaffirm this constitutional independence. Congress
has never declined to count an electoral vote because the
elector did not vote for a particular (living) person. This is
true even when that elector voted for a person other than
the person he or she previously pledged to vote for. 2
Indeed, Congress has only once even debated whether to
accept an anomalous vote (and decided to accept it). In
contrast, the historical record reveals a number of
Throughout this brief, we use the term “anomalous” to describe such
an elector, or such an electoral vote. Electors casting votes of this
nature, and the votes themselves, are often referred to as “faithless”
electors or votes.

2

-3-

instances in which Congress debated whether to accept
electoral votes for other reasons (e.g., when electoral
votes were cast a day late).
This robust historical record supports only one
conclusion: Our constitutional framework allows each
elector to vote as he or she chooses.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Framers Intended Each Elector To
Exercise Independent Judgment.

The Constitution authorizes “[e]ach state” to
“appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number
of Senators and Representatives to which the State may
be entitled in the Congress . . . .” U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1,
cl. 2 (the “Elector Clause”). The contemporaneous
historical record shows that the Framers crafted and
adopted the Elector Clause with the understanding that
they were empowering each elector, once appointed, to
vote freely based on their considered judgment.
A. The
Federalist
Papers
and
Other
Contemporaneous Evidence Establish That the
Framers Intended Each Elector to Exercise
Independent Judgment.
The Constitution’s plain language authorizes each
state’s legislature to decide how to choose its state’s
electors but not how each elector may or must vote. U.S.
Const., Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Instead, Article II constrains an
elector’s voting in only two respects: He or she must (1)
vote for two persons, (2) at least one of whom is not an
inhabitant of the same state as the elector. Id. cl. 3. Article
II contains no further limit on an elector’s voting choices,
nor does it confer state power to impose such limits.
-4-

Indeed, the Constitution’s bar against holders of federal
“Offices of Trust or Profit” from serving as electors only
makes sense if electors are empowered to vote as they
choose and not mere ministerial agents. Id. cl. 2; see
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803)
(“It cannot be presumed that any clause in the
constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore
such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words
require it.”).
The Federalist Papers envision the electors as a
group of individuals chosen by their fellow citizens to
exercise reasoned judgment in selecting the president
and vice-president. For example, Alexander Hamilton
wrote that “so important a trust” should only be
“confided” to “[a] small number of persons, selected by
their fellow-citizens from the general mass . . . .” The
Federalist No. 68 (A. Hamilton). Each should be “most
capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station”
of president and vice-president. Id. Such a group,
reasoned Hamilton, “will be most likely to possess the
information and discernment requisite to such
complicated investigations.” Id. Hamilton describes the
hallmarks of independent decision-making, envisioning
electors “acting under circumstances favorable to
deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the
reasons and inducements which were proper to govern
their choice.” Id.; see also The Federalist No. 64 (J. Jay)
(envisioning “an assembly of select electors [who] possess,
in a greater degree than kings, the means of extensive and
accurate information relative to men and characters”).
The election of 1789—the nation’s first presidential
election—provides key contemporaneous evidence of the
Framers’ design. As that election unfolded, Hamilton
explained that, “[e]very body is aware of that defect in the
-5-

constitution which renders it possible that the man
intended for Vice President may in fact turn up President.
Everybody sees that unanimity in Adams as Vice
President and a few votes insidiously withheld from
Washington might substitute the former to the latter.”
Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Wilson (Jan.
25, 1789), in 5 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 248
(Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962). Hamilton concluded that it
would “be prudent to throw away a few votes” for vice
president to avoid this possibility. Id. at 248–49. 3
Hamilton’s timing here is significant: he wrote the
language quoted above on January 25, 1789, after the
presidential electors were appointed but before they
voted. See 34 Journals of the Continental Congress 52223 (1788) (setting out 1789 election timeline).
Some electors followed Hamilton’s suggestion.
While all 69 voted for Washington, they split their second
votes among John Adams, John Hancock, John Jay, and
eight others. 1 Annals of Cong. 17 (1789). Adams easily
outpaced the field with 34 votes, making him VicePresident. Id. A Boston newspaper, discussing the nonAdams votes cast by electors from Connecticut, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania, “supposed” that the electors
“really wish[ed] to have Mr. Adams Vice-President, and
would have been unanimous for him, had they not been
fearful it might have excluded the Great Washington from
the Presidential Chair.” 4 DHFFE 180 (quoting the
Independent Chronicle (Boston) (Feb. 19, 1789)). Adams
himself, unhappy about the vote count, chalked it up to a
Hamilton was not the only, or the first, observer to comment on this
possibility. See 4 The Documentary History of the First Federal
Elections 53, 56, 125, 143-44 (Gordon DenBoer, Merrill Jensen, &
Robert A. Becker eds., 1990) (describing five letters or commentaries
between August 1788 and January 1789) (“DHFFE”); accord, 2
DHFFE 186.

3
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“dark and dirty Intrigue” designed to “Spread a Panick
least I should be President, and G.W. Vice President . . .
.” Id. at 285. The constitutional “defect” and remedy of
“throw[ing] away a few votes,” and the public discussion
around the 1789 election, make sense only on the premise
that each elector was free to choose how to vote.
B. Contemporaneous
State
Constitutional
Provisions
Modeled
and
Reflected
Elector
Independence.
Maryland’s electoral process likely served as a
model for the system ultimately enshrined in Article II.
The Maryland Constitution explicitly envisioned each
elector voting according to his “judgment and conscience”
in electing state senators. Md. Const. of 1776, Art. XVIII.
The Framers were undoubtedly aware of this system, and
it likely informed their design of the electoral college. See
Robert J. Delahunty, Is the Uniform Faithful
Presidential Electors Act Constitutional?, Cardozo L.
Rev. De Novo 165, 171-72 (2016); see also 6 The Life and
Correspondence of Rufus King 532-34 (Charles R. King
ed., 1900) (“[I]n this way the Senate of Maryland is
appointed; and it appears . . . Hamilton proposed this very
mode of choosing the Electors of the President.”).
Similarly, in 1792, the newly created state of
Kentucky adopted an electoral college to choose its state
senators and governor. Its constitution charged state
electors “to elect, without favor, affection, partiality, or
prejudice, such person for governor, and such persons for
senators, as they in their best judgment and conscience
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believe best qualified for the respective offices.” See Ky.
Const. of 1792, Art. I, § 14, Art. II, § 2. 4
Colorado relies on state legislation from the early
republic in support of its position, but also recognized that
those early statutes “deal primarily with replacing and
fining absent electors,” functions entirely consistent with
elector independence. See Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, No.
19-518, Pet. for Cert. at 24-25 (emphasis added). By
establishing consequences for electors who failed to show
up or fulfill their role, those statutes properly exercised
the states’ power to appoint without attempting to control
any elector’s votes. See Consol. Opening Br. for
Presidential Electors at 19-23 (contrasting powers to
appoint electors and control their votes). For example,
Massachusetts legislation recognized that “it may so
happen that one or more of the electors of President and
Vice-President may be prevented by death, sickness[,]
resignation or otherwise from attending on the day
appointed to give their votes.” 1800-1801 Mass. Acts 17273. The state then “Resolved That the said Electors . . .
who may then and there be present are hereby
empowered to fill up all vacancies which may happen as
aforesaid . . . by ballot from the people at large so many
suitable persons for Electors of president and vicepresident.” Id. at 173. Nothing in this resolve suggests a
power to replace an elector for anything but absence, nor
to direct or influence how any elector votes.
Colorado also wrongly claims that early electors in
Kentucky could “be replaced,” citing a 1799 law. Baca,
Pet. for Cert. at 25. The relevant statute said nothing
about replacement, nor purported to control any elector’s
In 1799, Kentucky scrapped its electoral college altogether in favor
of direct election of senators and the governor. See Ky. Const. of 1799,
Art. II, § 14, Art. III, § 2.

4
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votes. It simply provided that an elector “failing to
perform the duties herein required, and also the duties
prescribed by the laws of congress regulating his conduct,
… shall forfeit and pay one hundred dollars . . . .” 2
William Littell, Statute Law of Kentucky, ch. CCXII, § 20,
at 352 (1810). And it clarified that when electors actually
“proceed to the election of a president,” they do so
“pursuant to the constitution and laws of congress for
regulating their conduct,” id., not any state law
purporting to compel their votes. See also id. § 19 (stating
that every four years qualified voters shall “vote for some
discreet and proper person . . . as an elector . . . to vote for
a president of the United States, in conformity to the
constitution and laws of congress.”). In short, the
Kentucky statute did not authorize the state to replace, or
control the votes of, electors, but instead recognized them
as free to vote under federal law.
II.

Congress Has Consistently Recognized and
Maintained Elector Independence.

Congress’s debates and actions over time are
uniformly consistent with the Framers’ understanding
that an elector’s voting choices cannot be bound by state
law. Recognition of elector independence is a constant
theme through the crafting and implementing of the
Twelfth and Twenty-Third Amendments, and Congress’s
consideration of would-be amendments.
A. The Twelfth Amendment Was Adopted to Prevent
Strategic Partisan Voting Without Limiting Elector
Independence.
Presidential elections held before ratification of
the Twelfth Amendment all saw electors cast anomalous
votes. In 1796, electors casting undesignated votes elected
the losing party’s presidential candidate as vice-president
-9-

alongside the winning party’s presidential candidate. In
1800, Aaron Burr almost won the presidency in the House
and possibly in the Electoral College itself, nearly
inverting the Jefferson-Burr ticket. Congress could have
eliminated the partisan scheming that affected the 1796
and 1800 elections by limiting elector independence or
authorizing states to control the votes of electors. It did
neither.
Instead, Congress adopted the Twelfth
Amendment, which requires each elector to designate his
or her votes for president and vice-president. This reform
presumed each elector could vote independently and
changed the rules to deter the partisan tactics of the prior
elections. Indeed, the historical record reveals that no
member of the Seventh or Eighth Congress suggested
that state law could bind an elector’s votes, pledged or not.
See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 980 (1991)
(“The actions of the First Congress . . . are of course
persuasive evidence of what the Constitution means . . .
.”). Understood in historical context, the Twelfth
Amendment is a resounding affirmation of elector
independence.
1. The 1796 and 1800 elections
The 1796 election featured the greatest variety of
anomalous votes, and remains the only election resulting
in a president and vice-president from different parties.
Many of the anomalous votes were examples of partisan
jockeying: For example, Alexander Hamilton successfully
persuaded South Carolina’s eight electors to vote for
Jefferson and Federalist Thomas Pinckney (Adams’s
running mate). About thirty more Jefferson electors cast
their second votes for someone other than running mate
Aaron Burr. In anticipation of Hamilton’s ploy, some
Federalist electors sloughed off their votes for Pinckney.
- 10 -

All told, as many as 59 electors cast anomalous votes.
Other than Adams, Pinckney, Jefferson, and Burr, at
least nine other persons received votes. When the dust
settled, Adams and Jefferson received the first and
second highest electoral vote totals. 5
By contrast, the 1800 election featured only a
single anomalous vote. Yet, unlike 1796, this election
caused great alarm because Aaron Burr nearly bested
Thomas Jefferson for the presidency by capitalizing on
Hamilton’s “defect.” Jefferson and Burr defeated Adams
and his running mate Charles Pinckney, but Jefferson
and Burr each received 73 votes, sending the election to
the House of Representatives, which took 36 ballots
before finally electing Jefferson president. 10 Annals of
Cong. 1025-33 (1801).
In the wake of the election, stories surfaced of
Burr’s efforts to persuade electors to vote anomalously
and swing the presidency to him. See 36 Papers of
Thomas Jefferson 82–88 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950)
(hereafter Boyd); James Cheetham, A View of the
Political Conduct of Aaron Burr, Esq. Vice President of
the United States 44 (1802) (hereafter Cheetham). For
example, in December 1801, New York journalist James
Cheetham wrote to President Jefferson that Anthony
Lispenard, a Jefferson-Burr elector in New York, almost
cast his votes for Burr and a third candidate, but DeWitt
Clinton forced the New York electors to display their
ballots to each other. Boyd at 82–88. Cheetham also
claimed that Burr had attempted to recruit New Jersey
and South Carolina Federalist electors to change their
For an overview of the 1796 electoral vote, see Jeffrey L. Pasley,
The First Presidential Contest: 1796 and the Founding of American
Democracy 348–404 (Kansas 2013). See also Consol. Opening Br. for
Presidential Electors at 33–35 & App. B (listing anomalous votes).
5
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votes from Pinckney to Burr. Cheetham at 43-45. Had
even one elector switched his vote, Burr would have been
elected president by the Electoral College.
Although some historians doubt the veracity of
Cheetham’s claims, see, e.g., Milton Lomask, 1 Aaron
Burr 322 (1979), their truth is beside the point. It is
undisputed that such accounts were in the air. For
example, Albert Gallatin wrote to Thomas Jefferson in
1801 expressing concern that the Federalists might
connive to make Aaron Burr president in the next
election.
[I]t seems to me that there are but two ways,
either to support Burr once more, or to give
only one vote for President, scattering our
votes for the other person to be voted for. If we
do the first, we run, on the one hand, the risk of
the federal party making B. president; & we
seem, on the other, to give him an additional
pledge of being eventually supported hereafter
by the republicans for that office. If we
embrace the last party, we not only lose the
Vice President, but pave the way for the federal
successful candidate to that office to become
President. All this would be remedied by the
amendt. of distinguishing the votes for the two
offices . . . .
35 Boyd at 286. Jefferson responded that “the amendment
to the constitution of which you speak would be a remedy
to a certain degree.” 35 Boyd at 314. His response also
touted “a different amendment which I know will be
proposed, to wit, to have no electors, but let the people
vote directly, and the ticket which has a plurality of the
votes of any state, to be considered as receiving thereby
the whole vote of the state.”Id.
- 12 -

2. Congress did not consider limiting elector
independence as a response to concerns about the
early elections.
Congress could have addressed the concerns
raised by the 1796 and 1800 elections by binding electors
or eliminating them altogether. 6 Instead, it adopted the
Twelfth Amendment, directing each elector to designate
one vote for president and one for vice-president—an
approach entirely consistent with and supportive of each
elector’s independent judgment.
In addition to preventing the election of the
winning ticket’s vice presidential candidate as president
(as nearly happened in 1800), Congress was also
concerned with the election of one of the losing ticket’s
candidates as vice president (as happened in 1796). See,
e.g., 13 Annals of Cong. 85—87 (1803) (recording
statement by Democratic-Republican Senator Butler of
South Carolina that absent a constitutional amendment
“the people called Federalists will send a Vice President
into that chair”). In February 1802, during the Seventh
Congress, the Federalists introduced amendments
requiring designation of electoral votes and popular
election of electors from single-elector districts. 11 Annals
of Cong. 509, 602-603 (1802). In the waning days of the
session, and with no substantive discussion or debate, a
designation-only amendment comfortably passed the
House, but fell a single vote short of the required twothirds in the Senate. Id. 304, 1288-94. The next year the
Eighth Congress narrowly approved the Twelfth
Amendment, with the Senate voting in favor by 22-10, and

Amici’s research to date reveals no evidence of the “different
amendment” mentioned by Jefferson that would have eliminated
electors.

6
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the House Speaker leaving the chair to vote yea, making
the vote 84-42. 13 Annals of Cong. 209, 776 (1803).
The relevant debates reflect that Congress did not
consider limiting elector independence. A statement by
Representative Samuel Mitchill during the brief House
debate 7 on the Seventh Congress’s proposed designation
amendment is sometimes mistakenly cited as questioning
elector independence. See Baca, Pet. for Cert. at 29-30
(quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228 n.15 (1952));
Chiafalo v. Washington, No. 19-465, Br. in Opp’n to Pet.
for Writ of Cert. at 6-8, 18 (same); Baca, App. 158. In fact,
Mitchill was advocating for designation of votes:
Under the Constitution electors are to vote for
two persons, one of whom does not reside in the
State of the electors; but it does not require a
designation of the persons voted for. Wise and
virtuous as were the members of the
Convention, experience has shown that the
mode therein adopted cannot be carried into
operation; for the people do not elect a person
for an elector who, they know, does not intend
to vote for a particular person as President.
Therefore, practically, the very thing is
adopted, intended by this amendment.
11 Annals of Cong. 1289-1290 (1802). Read in its proper
context, Mitchill’s statement reflects the ambient concern
about tactical, partisan voting. It is not a comment against
(or even about) elector independence.
The near-inversion of the Jefferson-Burr ticket
animated the Eighth Congress’s debates as it passed the
Twelfth Amendment. For example, Representative
The debate in the Committee of the Whole and the House proper
spans only six pages in the Annals. 11 Annals of Cong. 1288-94 (1802).
7

- 14 -

Campbell told his colleagues that designation would
“secure to the people the benefits of choosing the
President, so as to prevent a contravention of their will as
expressed by Electors chosen by them . . . .” 13 Annals of
Cong. 421 (1803). Campbell further explained that, in the
“extraordinary cases” of House contingent elections,
designation would ensure “that those only should be
capable of Legislative election who possessed a strong
evidence of enjoying the confidence of the people.” Id.
Representative Clopton operationalized Campbell’s
observation, suggesting that a House contingent election
“should be restrained to the smallest number above an
unit, or to those persons who have equal electoral votes,”
id. at 424, making it “more likely to insure the ultimate
election of President and Vice President according to the
will of the people . . . .” Id. at 377. This debate—about
designation as a means to avoid inversion of president and
vice president—had nothing to do with elector
independence.
The Eighth Congress also sought to attenuate the
impact of strategic elector voting. Senator Butler of South
Carolina put it bluntly, referencing 1796: “[I]f you do not
alter the Constitution, the people called Federalists will
send a Vice President into that chair. . . .” Id. at 87; see
also id. at 98 (Senator William Cocke: “[T]he object of our
amendment was to prevent a Federal[ist] Vice President
being elected. . . .”). Although the Federalists in Congress
voted unanimously against the Twelfth Amendment, they
acknowledged the Democratic-Republican majority’s
interest in thwarting machinations designed to seat a
minority-party vice president alongside a majority-party
president. See id. at 171, 178 (statements of Senator
Tracy); 196 (statement of Senator Pickering).
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The Twelfth Amendment thus embodies a balance
between the Eighth Congress’s understanding that each
elector was free to vote independently (even contrary to a
pledged position) and its desire to prevent electors from
engaging in tactical, partisan voting intended to put a
winning ticket’s vice presidential candidate into the
presidency, or a losing-party candidate into the vicepresidency alongside a winning majority-party candidate.
As New York Secretary of State Thomas Tillotson
recognized in a letter to James Madison shortly after
Congress approved the Amendment:
In consequence of the Electors designating the
Characters they vote for as President and Vice
President, the field for management and
intrigue is very much circumscribed. Neither
Mr. Burr or his adherents can well afford to
sink down to their former indigence. December
20, 1803.
6 The Papers of James Madison, Secretary of State Series
189.
Ratifiers in the state legislatures also understood
that designation addressed these twin concerns. As State
Senator Bidwell commented during Massachusetts’
debate on the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment, “[i]t is
a manifest absurdity, that votes given for a candidate,
with a view to one office, should without the consent of the
voters, through the agency of other electors, or by mere
calamity, be liable to be thus converted into votes for
another office not intended.” Massachusetts Legislature
Debate on The Amendments to the Constitution, Boston
Independent Chronicle (1804) (emphasis added).
Finally, leading nineteenth century constitutional
interpreters confirm this baseline understanding of the
- 16 -

elector as an independent actor. For example, Justice
Story bemoaned the “notorious” fact that “the electors
are now chosen wholly with reference to particular
candidates” and that as a result “the whole foundation of
the system, so elaborately constructed, is subverted.”
Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States, § 1457 (1833). His premise—that electors
may feel compelled to vote according to party alignment
or pledges—accepts as a given the legal “foundation of the
system,” namely, that electors choose for whom to vote.
See also, William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the
United States of America 57–58 (2d ed. 1829) (arguing
that public pledges of electors destroy the foundations of
the electoral college, and noting that they are bound by
political not legal compulsion); William Alexander Duer,
A Course of Lectures on the Constitutional
Jurisprudence of the United States; Delivered Annually
in Columbia College, New York 96 (1843) (same); Thomas
M. Cooley,The General Principles of Constitutional Law
in the United States of America 161 (1898) (“The theory
of the Constitution is that there shall be chosen by each
State a certain number of its citizens . . . who shall
independently cast their suffrages for President and Vice
President of the United States, according to the dictates
of their individual judgments.”) (emphasis omitted).
Further, Senator Daniel Webster, one of
Congress’s greatest constitutional interpreters, urged
that Massachusetts’ pro-Webster Whig electors “should
act with entire freedom from all considerations merely
personal to myself; and that they should give the vote of
the state in the manner they think most likely to be
useful” in the context of the 1836 election. See 4 The
Papers of Daniel Webster Series 1, Correspondence 161–
62 (Charles M. Wiltse ed. 1980) (letter published in the
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December 17, 1836 Niles Weekly Register) (emphasis
added).
Properly contextualized, the Twelfth Amendment
limited an elector’s ability to vote tactically to achieve a
partisan outcome by requiring each elector to designate
their votes for president and vice-president. That reform,
like Article II’s original design of the electoral process,
presumes that each elector can and will vote
independently.
B. The Deliberations and Actions of Subsequent
Congresses Have Consistently Recognized Elector
Independence.
Proposals and deliberations in later congresses
confirm an accepted background understanding: that
Article II and the Twelfth Amendment protect elector
independence. Even where these proposals were not
adopted, the record provides useful historical evidence of
the political consensus. For example, several amendments
proposed in the early nineteenth century would have
replaced election by the House, when no candidate
received the votes of a majority of the electors appointed,
in favor of sending the choice of president and vice
president back to the electors. 41 Annals of Cong. 41, 4346, 74, 864-66, 1179-81 (1823-24). The mere consideration
of that option only makes sense if Congress understood
electors as free to change their votes even after adoption
of the Twelfth Amendment.
Congress also considered, and rejected, abolishing
the office of elector while preserving electoral votes. See,
e.g., Cong. Deb. 22nd Congress, 1st Sess. at 1963-64
(1832) (statement of Rep. Erastus Root); id., 2d Sess. at
940 (1833). Reporting on such a proposal in 1874, a Senate
report noted “[t]hat the candidates for electors should be
- 18 -

pledged in advance to vote for particular persons was not
only not contemplated by the framers of the constitution,
but was explicitly excluded by their theory.” S. Rep. No.
43-395, at 3 (1874).
Indeed, Congress reaffirmed elector independence
in 1932, during the adoption of the Twentieth
Amendment. First, the language of the Amendment itself
acknowledges elector independence in addressing House
contingent elections:
The Congress may by law provide for the case
of the death of any of the persons from whom
the House of Representatives may choose a
President whenever the right of choice shall
have devolved upon them, and for the case of
the death of any of the persons from whom the
Senate may choose a Vice President whenever
the right of choice shall have devolved upon
them.
U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 4 (emphasis added).
The “right of choice” is the right of each Member
of Congress to choose a President or Vice President under
the Twelfth Amendment. There is only one place from
which this right of choice can “devolve[] upon” members
of Congress—the right of choice possessed by each
elector, as the Twelfth Amendment makes explicit (and
Article II implies).
Commenting on the need for this constitutional
enhancement, the accompanying House Committee
report noted:
A constitutional amendment is not necessary to
provide for the case of the death of a party
nominee before the November elections.
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Presidential electors and not the President are
chosen at the November election. The electors,
under the present Constitution would be free to
choose a President, notwithstanding the death
of a party nominee. Inasmuch as the electors
would be free to choose a President, a
constitutional amendment is not necessary to
provide for the case of the death of a party
nominee after the November elections and
before the electors vote.
H. Rep. No. 72-345, at 5 (1932) (emphasis added).
Mid-twentieth century Senate debates also reflect
the understanding that electors are independent. For
example, as the Senate debated the Twenty-Second
Amendment, Rhode Island Republican Theodore Green
contemplated “[w]hether or not the President and Vice
President should be elected by the Electoral College, as
at present, and if so whether or not the members should
be legally bound to vote in accordance with their
instructions. … There is no provision in the law as to that.”
93 Cong. Rec. 1964 (1947). A 1948 survey of state laws
found that only California and Oregon had laws requiring
pledges from electors and recommended wider adoption
of laws requiring pledges, but observed that “[n]o action,
however, could probably be taken to compel the election
to abide by his pledge.” State Law on the Nomination,
Election, and Instruction of Presidential Electors 42(3)
The American Political Science Review 523, 529 (Ruth C.
Silva, 1948).
Elector freedom was also discussed during a 1956
debate as the Senate considered two proposed
constitutional amendments to prohibit the winner-takeall, unit rule. Although opposed to elimination of the unit
rule, John F. Kennedy did support a proposal to amend
- 20 -

the Constitution to prohibit elector discretion. 102 Cong.
Rec. 5157 (March 20, 1956). Kennedy continued by noting
that “half of the States have already removed the danger
of electoral college delegates not reflecting the views of
the States. States can take care of that situation
themselves.” Id. (Emphasis added.) This drew a sharp
response from Tennessee Democrat Albert Gore and New
Jersey Republican Clifford Case:
[Gore] … under the present system it is an
elector's constitutional right to cast a ballot as
he pleases. Legally he has the opportunity to do
so. . . .
[Case] I must disagree with the statement that
an elector, even though there may be no law in
his State requiring him to do so, is free to cast
his vote as he wishes. He is not free, under our
system. He is under the greatest obligation to
conform with the-[Gore] Which is a moral obligation.
[Case] Yes; a moral obligation, which is the
greatest of all.
Id. (emphasis added). Gore and Case got it right. The
ongoing discussion about the electoral process that began
with the framing of Article II consistently shows that each
elector is free to vote according to his or her independent
judgment, and that the consequences of voting
independently are political, not legal.
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C. Congress Understood That State Legislatures
Lacked the Power to Prevent an Elector From
Exercising Independent Judgment When It Approved
and Implemented the Twenty-Third Amendment.
The story of the Twenty-Third Amendment
continues the unbroken historical narrative of elector
independence. That Amendment provides for the
appointment of electors for the District of Columbia “as
the Congress may direct.” U.S. Const., Amend. XXIII, §
1. Thus, Congress first used its constitutional authority to
amend the Constitution and award electors to the District
of Columbia. Then it passed legislation to implement that
provision and direct the manner of appointment for the
District’s electors.
To accomplish the first step, the Twenty-Third
Amendment provides that the District of Columbia shall
appoint:
A number of electors of President and Vice
President equal to the whole number of
Senators and Representatives in Congress to
which the District would be entitled if it were a
State . . . and they shall meet in the District and
perform such duties as provided by the twelfth
article of amendment.
Id.
The House Judiciary Committee report
accompanying the resolution that eventually became the
Amendment expressly noted that the proposed language
“follows closely, insofar as it is applicable, the language of
article II of the Constitution.” H.R. Rep. No. 86-1698, at 4
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(1960). 8 Two representatives reiterated this equivalence
during the House’s sole, two-hour debate on the TwentyThird Amendment. 106 Cong. Rec. 12553, 12558, 12571
(June 14, 1960). The Senate then approved it after no
more than an hour of debate, and without a recorded vote,
on June 16, 1960. Id. at 12850-58.
Needless to say, there is no evidence in the
Congressional Record of any comment or discussion
suggesting that the amendment empowered Congress to
bind the District’s electors.
Congress returned to the subject of the District’s
electors when it enacted enabling legislation in 1961. The
resulting statute provides that an elector must “take an
oath or solemnly affirm that he or she will vote for the
candidates of the party he or she has been nominated to
represent, and it shall be his or her duty to vote in such
manner in the electoral college.” D.C. Code § 1–1001.08(g)
(2017). Critically, the relevant hearings reveal a
consensus view that Congress could, at most, enact a
statute applying “moral suasion” to each D.C. elector’s
voting choices but could not prevent an elector from
voting independently.
That question first arose when Representative J.
Carlton Loser inquired during the testimony of Walter
Tobriner, President of the District of Columbia Board of
Commissioners, “Is there some Constitutional provision
Committee reports are considered a particularly reliable source of
Congress’ intended meaning. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76
(1984) (“In surveying legislative history we have repeatedly stated
that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature’s intent lies
in the Committee Reports on the bill, which represent the considered
and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in
drafting and studying proposed legislation.”) (internal quotation
omitted).

8
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involving the question of electors, how they shall vote?”
To Amend the Act of August 12, 1955 Relating to
Elections in the District of Columbia, hearing on H.R.
5955, House of Representatives Subcommittee No. 3 on
the Committee of the District of Columbia, 87th Cong. 3437 (1961). The subsequent colloquy among Tobriner,
Loser, and Representative George Huddleston made
clear that such a provision would have no legal effect:
[Rep. Huddleston] … Once the electors are
appointed and certified as the electors of that
party, if that party carries the election these
electors are still authorized to vote for
whomever they please.
[Rep. Loser] But this Administration bill
requires them to vote for the party which they
represent.
[Rep. Huddleston] I think that has a moral
suasion. I don’t think that has any legal effect
at all.
….
[Rep. Loser] Are you saying, sir, that the
provision of the bill is ineffective or is not
compulsory that the electors vote for the
candidate of the party they represent?
[Mr. Tobriner] There is not provision in the bill,
sir, setting forth any compulsory means by
which this may be enforced.
[Rep. Huddleston] I think probably that is
preferable to some naked statement that the
electors are required to support a candidate,
because that has no legal effect at all; whereas
your oath would accomplish this same purpose
- 24 -

because it also gives rise to a moral suasion.
When a man takes an oath, although that oath
has no legal effect either, still a person thinks a
long time before he violates an oath he has
given. I think your provision would accomplish
the same purpose from a legal point of view as
the Administration bill.
Id. at 34-37 (emphasis added).
The Senate passed the bill 66-6 without discussing
the possibility of legal consequences for an anomalous
elector. 107 Cong. Rec. 20217 (Sept. 19, 1961). When the
bill came back from the conference committee, the
reporting senator noted that “it was agreed that a duty
would be imposed on a person chosen as an elector to vote
in the electoral college for the candidate of the political
party which he represents” and the Senate approved the
report without further discussion. Id. at 21052 (Sept. 23,
1961). However, the statute provides no legal
consequences, requiring only that an elector must “take
an oath or solemnly affirm that he or she will vote for the
candidates of the party he or she has been nominated to
represent, and it shall be his or her duty to vote in such
manner in the electoral college.” D.C. Code § 1–
1001.08(g). As Representative Huddleston articulated,
the statute was designed to make an elector “think a long
time” before casting a vote for someone other than “the
candidates of the party he or she has been nominated to
represent.” To go further, by, for example, barring
electors from voting otherwise or punishing them for
doing so, would have had “no legal effect at all” in light of
the text and structure of Article II and the Twelfth
Amendment. Congress thus respected that boundary in
adopting and implementing the Twenty-Third
Amendment.
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As the Twenty-Third Amendment was being
ratified by the states in 1961, the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments considered
twenty-three resolutions making a total of twenty-five
proposals regarding presidential elections. A single
report covered many of them. S. Rep. No. 87-1305 (1962).
The section titled “The office of presidential elector”
opened with the following comment:
Under present constitutional provisions, the
elector is free to exercise his independent
judgment in voting, regardless of whether he is
instructed by State law or has given a pledge,
or whether his own name was even on the
ballot. This power to frustrate the popular will
has seldom been used, but its continued
existence is unnecessary under any system.
Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
This section concluded “All pending proposals
would eliminate the possibility of independent or
unpledged electors.” Id. at 10. None of these proposals
was sent to the states. In sum, Congress has never taken
an action suggesting that the Constitution, as originally
adopted or as amended, empowers a state to prohibit or
penalize an elector for exercising discretion.
III.

Congress Has Never Failed to Count an
Anomalous Electoral Vote.

Congress’s consistent practice of counting
anomalous electoral votes is additional compelling
evidence that electors enjoy independence in deciding
how to cast their votes. In the wake of the Twelfth
Amendment, at least four nineteenth century elections
saw electors vote anomalously for president, and at least
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eight saw anomalous votes for vice-president. 9 Critically,
Congress tallied and accepted all those votes without
question. See Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act
Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1654, 1678-94 (2002)
(hereafter Kesavan) (surveying congressional debates
questioning legitimacy of electoral votes). In fact,
Congress has never refused to count and accept the
electoral votes cast by an anomalous elector. By counting
those votes, Congress effectuates the selection of the
president and vice-president. Id. at 1658. This unbroken
record of accepting anomalous votes confirms Congress’s
longstanding view that state laws may apply moral
suasion, but they do not, because they cannot, override
the authority conferred on electors by the Constitution to
vote as they choose. Indeed, Congress has consistently
counted anomalous electoral votes up through the 2016
election. 10 163 Cong. Rec. H189-90 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2017).
This Court’s decision in McPherson v. Blacker, 146
U.S. 1 (1892), did not alter this practice, nor otherwise
For president these were 1808, 1816, 1820, and 1872. For vice
president they were 1812, 1816, 1820, 1824, 1828, 1840, 1872, and 1896.
10
For a compendium through 1992, see 139 Cong. Rec. 961 (1993). In
2000, one of the electors abstained and the joint convention of
Congress took no notice. 147 Cong. Rec. 33-34 (Jan. 6, 2001). In 2004
John Edwards received a presidential electoral vote and a vice
presidential electoral vote from the same elector and once again
Congress recorded the votes per its usual practice. 151 Cong. Rec.,
H85 (Jan. 6, 2005). In 2016 seven electors voted anomalously for
president and six did so for vice president, and Congress accepted all
of these electoral votes without comment. See 163 Cong. Rec., H18690 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2017). Five electors from Hawaii and Washington
cast their votes in violation of State law. There was no statute in Texas
applying to its two Republican electors, who failed to vote for Donald
Trump. The process by which Congress counts votes and may choose
to reject them is set forth in the Electoral Count Act of 1887, codified
at 3 U.S.C. §§ 5-6, 15-18.
9
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undermine elector independence. The issue in McPherson
was not elector independence, but whether electors could
be chosen by district. Id. at 24-25. Read in that context,
the holding in McPherson was that the district system of
choosing electors remained constitutionally valid even
though it had been dormant for a long time. Id. at 36. To
the extent it had anything to say about the independence
of electors, those statements were dicta.
The first election following McPherson illustrated
that the decision did not limit elector independence. In
1896, William Jennings Bryan received the presidential
nominations of both the Democratic Party and the
Populist Party. Arthur Sewall of Maine was his running
mate on the Democratic line. On the Populist line, it was
Thomas Watson of Georgia. 11 Bryan’s strategy was to run
a single slate of electors in as many states as possible,
some pledged to Bryan and Sewall, others pledged to
Bryan and Watson. 12 Washington was one such state, with
two Bryan electors pledged to Sewall and two to Watson.
Bryan carried Washington, and its four electors faithfully
cast their electoral votes for vice president as pledged. 13
A different situation occurred in Kansas, where
two separate Bryan lines (Democrat and Populist)
appeared on the ballot with the same set of electors.
Breidenthal v. Edwards, 57 Kan. 332, 46 P. 469 (1896).
Knowing that the Bryan electors all intended to vote for
Sewall rather than Watson, Kansas Populist Party
chairman John Breidenthal brought suit to have Watson’s
name removed from the ballot. The Kansas Supreme
Karl Rove, The Triumph of William McKinley: Why the Election
of 1896 Still Matters 295–96, 302, 304–05 (Simon & Schuster 2015).
12
William Jennings Bryan, The First Battle. A Story of the Campaign
of 1896 293 (W. B. Conkey Company 1896).
13
See 29 Cong. Rec. 1694, 1715 (Feb. 10, 1897).
11
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Court ruled against Breidenthal seven days before the
general election, reasoning that “if these electors should
be chosen, they will be under no legal obligation to
support Sewall, Watson, or any other person named by a
political party, but they may vote for any eligible citizen
of the United States.” Id. at 470.
In the end, when the electoral votes were tallied,
the Bryan electors in Colorado, Idaho, and North
Carolina did not cast their vice-presidential votes as
originally pledged. See “Election in All States,” The New
York Times (Nov. 4, 1896). Nevertheless, their votes were
counted by Congress without question. That result, and
the Breidenthal decision, powerfully indicate that
McPherson did not curtail elector independence.
Only once has Congress even debated the question
of whether to accept a vote cast by an anomalous elector. 14
In 1968 an elector cast his votes for George Wallace and
Curtis LeMay rather than Richard Nixon and Spiro
Agnew. When Congress met to count the electoral vote
Senator Edmund Muskie and Representative James
O’Hara filed a formal objection to counting the elector’s
vote, arguing the Twelfth Amendment constitutionalized
Notably, Congress has not hesitated debating questions relating to
the legitimacy of electoral votes for other reasons. See Kesavan at
1679-92 (describing several examples from 1809 through 1877). For
example, in 1856 a blizzard hit Madison, Wisconsin making it
impossible for Wisconsin’s electors to meet. They cast their electoral
votes the next day, one day after the day prescribed by law, and
Congress spent the better part of two days debating whether or not
to accept the votes. See Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3rd Sess., 644–60,
662–68 (1857). Similarly, in 1873, Congress decided not to count votes
for Horace Greeley, who had died after the November election, but
before the electors met, and had received a handful of electoral votes
from electors who voted for him even knowing that he was dead, but
only after close votes. This is the only time that Congress rejected an
electoral vote because of the name on the ballot. Kesavan at 1687.
14
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an obligation for each elector to vote according to the
popular vote in his or her state. 115 Cong. Rec. 146 (Jan.
6, 1969). In the end, the objection failed by votes of 33-58
in the Senate (id. at 246) and 170-228 in the House. Id. at
170-71, 246. Thus, since the 1873 debate about electoral
votes for the recently deceased Horace Greeley, the only
time that Congress debated the question of whether to
count the votes of an anomalous elector it counted the
votes, decisively rejecting the idea that the Twelfth
Amendment imposed an obligation on electors to vote in
accordance with State popular vote tallies.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the historical record confirms that, under
our constitutional framework, each elector is free to vote
as he or she chooses. Therefore, this Court should reverse
in Chiafalo and affirm in Baca.
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